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ABSTRACT
Technical progress in the evolution of a 
transportation system, is marked by various 
stages. Namely, concept, design and 
development, test and verification, and 
operations. The airline industry has been 
successfully transitionirg high technology 
equipment through these phase? both safely 
and economically. The technique? which they 
employ are being effectively applied to the 
Space Shuttle Program, as it enters the 
operational era.
INTRODUCTION
Pan Arn is working with the Lockheed Space 
Operations Company and fvjASA to inject airline 
techniques ana procedures into the shuttle 
turnaround processing operations at both KSC 
and VLS. We are currently involved in three 
primary areas - process planning and control, 
logistics and operations analysis. It is 
within this latter erca that we have our 
largest challenge and broadest area of 
operation. Our task is to identify changes 
in the processing system which will allow 
higher launch rates, reduce operating costs 
and maintain the safety record established by 
earlier launches. Solutions to this task are 
obviously varied and complex. However, we 
are confident that progress can be made by 
the application of airline operations and 
maintenance techniques to shuttle processing.
Our operations analysis efforts are focused 
in three general areas - processing analysis, 
maintenance analysis, and personnel 
productivity. Processing analysis is 
concerned with the end-to-enc review cf the 
entire ground processing cycle to identify 
constraints to launch, rate increases, 
processing deficiencies and cost anomalies.
Maintenance analysis focuses on the 
maintenance program for both flight el CM 
and ground support hardware. Personnel 
productivity could actually be considered a 
subject of processing analysis. After all, 
the prime components of the ground 
processing cycle are the flight hardware 
elements, ground support facilities and 
equipment, the processing and maintenance 
program, spare parts and material , and 
people. We have emphasized personnel 
productivity because it is involved in all 
segments of the processing cycle and is 
potentially the easiest area to realize 
improvements. It doesn't cost a lot of 
money as do increases in spares, new 
facilities and more reliable flight 
hardware. It only requires an awareness of 
non-productive time and a management 
discipline to correct the conditions causing 
the non-productivity.
The prime topic for this paper is Pan Arc's 
approach to maintenance analysis for the 
shuttle program. We are applying airline 
industry maintenance program techniques tc 
both flight element and ground support 
hardware. These are based upon our 
experience with and confidence in the 
maintenance programs derived through the 
Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) established 
by the airline industry.
The airline n^intenance concept (MSG-3) 
analyzes from the consequence of failure 
standpoint. It establishes an initial 
maintenance program made up of tasks that 
are both applicable and effective, while 
recognizing key safety factors. It also 
provides for the modification of the initial 
program through the analysis of operating 
data. This results in a viable maintenance 
program over- the life of the vehicle. It 
assures that only those tasks which prevent
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deterioration of inherent reliability and 
safety are scheduled during the processing 
cycle.
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM EVOLUTION
In the early phases of aviation, maintenance 
programs were developed by a few experienced 
mechanics. They looked at the airplane, they 
talked to the manufacturer and they decided 
what should be done. Also, the maintenance 
activity was based on the cause and effect 
relationship of the equipment. Thus, 
traditional maintenance concepts evolved 
based on this type of experience.
Early aircraft had very little tolerance for 
failure. Generally, all parts had to 
function properly. Many of the early 
accidents and fatalities were the result of 
mechanical failures.
The lessons that were learned from these 
early experiences were:
Mechanical parts wear out. 
Wearouts cause failures. 
Failures affect safety.
This then became the doctrine of preventive 
maintenance. It was logical. It was based 
on experience. It became a tradition.
Traditional Concept
Another way of viewing this traditional cause 
and effect relationship, as it applies to 
maintenance programs, is:
Reliability and safety are directly 
related
or
failures of parts or components have a 
direct affect on operating safety.
Reliability degrades with increase in 
age
or
there is a finite unairworthy age for 
each part.
This traditional concept results in the 
conclusion that the more frequently equipment 
was overhauled, the more it was protected 
from failure.
Thus, in the early phases of aviation, or the 
make-it-work phase, most of the maintenance 
emphasis was placed on keeping parts from 
wearing out. Programs were developed 
intuitively, and for the most part, they 
worked quite wel1.
Relationship Between Reliability and Safety
For many years, these maintenance concepts 
remained static, while considerable progress
was being made in aircraft design. The 
designers recognized that certain failures 
could not be effectively prevented or 
reduced. Therefore, designs incorporated 
failure-tolerance or redundancy.
Failure-tolerance significantly altered the 
relationship between reliability and safety.
The reliability of an aircraft is a function 
of the discrete reliability of its parts 
which depend on their inherent design 
qualities. Operating safety is also a 
function of the inherent design 
characteristics. The dependence of both 
reliability and safety upon the inherent 
design characteristics leads to the 
conclusion that safety and reliability are 
necessarily related. This is not so. 
Another factor controls this relationship, 
i.e., the ability of the design to retain 
its essential functions even though failures 
have occurred.
Thus, where in the early phases of aviation, 
reliability was directly related to safety, 
now redundancy or failure-tolerance enhances 
safety by assuring that system or hardware 
failures do not degrade operating safety.
Relationship Between Age and Reliability
The rationale for periodic maintenance is to 
restore resistance to failure prior to the 
failure occurring. This implies some 
predictability and an effective task.
However, the time honored belief or perhaps 
intuitive concept that reliability is 
directly related to overhaul intervals 
cannot be confirmed on complex units. For 
many items, contrary to expectations, 
likelihood of failure did not increase with 
increasing time. The failure rates were 
constant or independent of time. Hundreds 
of analyses showed that there is no optimum 
time for overhaul for many complex units. 
Consequently, maintenance policy based 
exclusively on operating age has little or 
no effect on failure rate. As a matter of 
fact, in many cases, there was an increase 
in failures due to maintenance induced 
actions.
By the late 1950's and early 1960's, there 
was sufficient data and maintenance costs 
were sufficiently high to question the 
effectiveness of preventive maintenance 
vis-a-vis reliability. At the same time, 
the FAA was frustrated by experience showing 
that changes in overhaul content or 
frequency did not produce changes in the 
failure rates of certain engines.
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This lead to the establishment of 
FAA/Industry reliability programs in the 
early 1960's. The objective of the 
reliability programs was to control 
reliability through an analysis of factors 
that affect reliability and provide a system 
of actions to improve reliability. This 
approach was a direct challenge to the 
traditional concepts that length of time 
between overhauls controls failure rates.
The conclusion of this activity led to the 
recognition that:
Overhaul has little effect on 
reliability of complex units. 
Preventative maintenance has no effect 
on the reliability of certain parts.
Experience with MSG 1/2
The culmination of these activities was the 
development of MSG-1 and MSG-2 (Maintenance 
Steering Group) decision-diagram logic. The 
MSG process ties together safety and 
economics and the effectiveness of action.
Until the MSG process, maintenance was a 
craft acquired mostly through experience and 
rarely examined analytically. The 
significance of MSG-1/2 is that it introduced 
engineering discipline into the maintenance 
program development. It quantified the 
judgement previously used. It recognized and 
documented what aircraft had been telling us 
for years and took into account the inherent 
design safety of the aircraft and equipment.
MSG-1/2 developed a logic which categorized 
safety and economics and provided an orderly 
and disciplined process to:
Identify all the important elements of 
the aircraft.
Analyze their failure mode and effect. 
Develop systems to control these.
These procedures provide a systematic review 
of the aircraft design so that in the absence 
of real experience, the best maintenance 
process could be utilized for each component 
and system. In all of this effort, however, 
good technical judgement was still a 
prerequisite.
The high expectation for the wide body 
aircraft in the late 1960's have been 
confirmed by the experience of the 1970's. 
First, the B747 and subsequently, the DC-10 
and L1011 have achieved the highest levels of 
safety and comfort. From a maintenance 
program standpoint, the most significant
achievement has been the validation and 
realization of the benefits of the program 
developed using MSG-1/2 techniques.
MSG-1 was developed for the B747 and the 
programs implemented were the result of the 
application of the MSG-1 logic. MSG-1 was 
revised and updated and then was adopted as 
MSG-2 for the subsequent DC-10 and L1011 
wide body aircraft. The Europeans, working 
concurrently, adopted some of the same 
principles and developed EMSG-2 and used it 
on the Concorde.
The wide body aircraft were the first to 
exclusively use the MSG-1/2 techniques for 
their maintenance program development. The 
resulting programs achieved reliability 
levels equal to, or better than, those of 
previous jets, while holding the line on 
maintenance costs.
Development of MSG-3
Like any other activity, once you have an 
opportunity to gain experience and see how 
something works, the process to improve it 
begins. With MSG-2 now ten years old, we 
could see where improvement should be made. 
The revision to MSG-2 was initiated and 
MSG-3 evolved.
There are a number of differences between 
MSG-2 and MSG-3. However, MSG-3 does not 
constitute a fundamental departure from the 
previous version, it is built upon the 
existing framework of MSG-2 which has been 
validated by years of reliable aircraft 
operation using maintenance programs based 
thereon.
MSG-3 has adjusted the decision logic flow 
paths ±o provide a more rational procedure 
for task definition and a more 
straightforward and linear progression 
through the decision logic.
MSG-3 logic takes a "from the top down" or 
consequence of failure approach. At the 
outset, the functional failure is assessed 
for consequence of failure and is assigned 
one of two basic categories:
Safety 
Economics
Further classification determines 
sub-categories based on whether the failure 
is evident to or hidden from the operating 
crew. (For Structures, category designation 
is "significant" or "other" structure, and 
all functional failures are considered 
safety consequence items).
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With the consequence category established, 
only those task selection questions pertinent 
to the category need be asked. This 
eliminates unnecessary assessments and 
expedites the analysis. A definite 
applicability and effectiveness criteria has 
been developed to provide a more vigorous 
selection of tasks. In addition, this 
approach helps to eliminate items from the 
analytical procedure whose failures have no 
significant consequence.
Task selection questions are arranged in a 
sequence such that the most preferred task, 
most easily accomplished, is considered 
first. In the absence of a positive 
indication concerning the applicability and 
effectiveness of a task, the next task in 
sequence must be considered, down to and 
including possible redesign.
Structures logic has evolved into a form 
which more directly assesses the possibility 
of structural deterioration processes. 
Considerations of fatigue, corrosion, 
accidental damage, age exploration programs 
and others, are incorporated into the logic 
diagram and are routinely considered.
MSG-3 recognizes the new damage tolerance 
rules of the Federal Aviation Regulations and 
the supplemental inspection programs. 
Concepts such as multiple failures, effect of 
failure on adjacent structure, crack growth 
from detectable to critical length, and 
threshold exploration for potential failure, 
are also covered.
MSG-3 logic is task-oriented and not 
maintenance process oriented (MSG-2). This 
eliminates the confusion associated with the 
various interpretations of Condition 
Monitoring (CM), On-Condition (OC), Hard Time 
(HT) and the difficulties encountered when 
attempting to determine what maintenance was 
being accomplished to an item that carried 
one of the process labels.
Servicing/Lubrication is included to ensure 
that important task is considered each time 
an item is analyzed.
Treatment of hidden functional failures is 
more thorough than that of MSG-2.
The effect of concurrent or multiple failure 
is considered. Sequential failure concepts 
are used as part of the hidden functional 
failure assessment (Systems, Powerplant) and 
multiple failure is considered in structural 
evaluation.
There is a clear separation between tasks 
that are economically desirable and those 
that are required for safe operation.
The structures decision logic no longer 
contains a specific numerical rating system. 
The responsibility for developing rating 
systems has been assigned to the individual 
maintenance program review teams.
EFFICIENT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
The prime purpose of MSG-3 is to assist in 
the development of an initial scheduled 
maintenance program for new types of 
aircraft and/or powerplants. The purpose of 
the program developed is to maintain the 
inherent safety and reliability levels of 
equipment.
It is desirable, therefore, to define the 
objectives and the content of an efficient 
maintenance program and the method by which 
the program can be developed.
The objectives of an efficient airline 
maintenance program are:
To ensure realization of the inherent 
safety and reliability levels of 
equipment.
To restore safety and reliability to 
their inherent levels when 
deterioration has occurred. 
To obtain the information necessary for 
design improvement of those items whose 
inherent reliability proves inadequate. 
To accomplish these goals at minimum 
total cost, including maintenance costs 
and the costs of residual failures.
These objectives recognize that maintenance 
programs, as such, cannot correct 
deficiencies in the inherent safety and 
reliability levels of the equipment. The 
maintenance program can only prevent 
deterioration of such inherent levels. If 
the inherent levels are found to be 
unsatisfactory, design modification is 
necessary to obtain improvement.
The content of the maintenance program 
itself consists of two groups of tasks:
1) A group of scheduled tasks to be
accomplished at specified intervals. 
The objective of these tasks is to 
prevent deterioration of the inherent 
safety and reliability levels of the 
equipment. The tasks in a scheduled 
maintenance program may include:
Lubrication/Servicing
Operating Crew Monitoring
Operational Check
Inspection/Functional Check
Restoration
Discard
Combinations of the above
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2) A group of non-scheduled tasks which 
result from:
The scheduled tasks accomplished at 
other than the specified intervals. 
Reports of malfunctions (usually 
originated by the operating and 
maintenance crews). 
Data analysis.
The objective of these non-scheduled tasks is 
to restore the equipment to an acceptable 
condition.
An efficient program is one which schedules 
only those tasks necessary to meet the stated 
objectives. It does not schedule additional 
tasks which will increase maintenance costs 
without a corresponding increase in 
reliability protection.
MSG-3 describes the method for developing the 
scheduled maintenance program. Non-scheduled 
maintenance results from scheduled tasks, 
normal operation or data analysis.
MSG-3 System/Powerplant Analysis Method
The first essential element is to identify 
all the Maintenance Significant Items (MSI).
Selection of an MSI begins at the highest 
manageable level, i.e., system, subsystem, 
component or part. MSI's are identified as 
those whose failure:
Could affect safety (on ground or in
flight) and/or
Is detectable during operations, and/or
Could have significant operational
economic impact, and/or
Could have significant non-operational
economic impact.
Once identified, then each MSI.must have 
documented, its:
Function - the normal characteristic
actions of the item.
Functional failure - how an items fails
to perform its function.
Failure effect - what is the result of
functional failure.
Failure cause - why failure occurs.
For each significant item, an analysis of the 
functional failures, failure causes and the 
applicability and effectiveness of the tasks 
must be carried out. Each functional failure 
will be processed through the logic into one 
of the five"consequence of failure 
categories.
The process begins at the operating crew 
level by asking the question:
IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL 
FAILURE EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW 
DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF NORMAL 
DUTIES?
This question is asked for each functional 
failure. It is intended to segregate the 
evident and hidden failures from the 
operating crew perspective.
A hidden function is defined as one which:
Is normally active and whose cessation 
will not be evident to the operating 
crew during their performance of normal 
duties.
Is normally inactive and whose 
readiness to perform prior to it being 
needed, will not be evident to the 
operating crew during performance of 
their normal duties.
A "YES 11 answer leads to the following 
question:
DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR 
SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE 
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT 
ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY?
In order to answer this question, the 
following definitions are in order:
Direct - a direct functional failure 
achieves its effect by Itself and not 
in combination with other functional 
failures.
Adverse Effect on Safety - consequence 
of failure are extremely serious, may 
cause loss of vehicle and/or injury to 
occupants.
Operating - this is the interval of 
time from the moment the vehicle is 
operating under its own power to the 
moment it comes to rest at the next 
point of landing.
A "YES" answer leads to the safety effects 
category for task determination. A "YES" 
answer requires that there be an applicable 
and effective task or the part must be 
redesigned.
A "NO" answer indicates an economic effect 
and these tasks are developed based on the 
functional failure effect on the capability
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of the aircraft to perform its operating 
mission requirement.
This is taken into account by asking:
DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A 
DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING 
CAPABILITY?
The question reviews consequence of failure 
which:
Would require correction prior to
dispatch.
Would compromise the mission flexibility
by imposing operating restrictions.
This question is asked of each evident, 
non-safety functional failure. The task 
selection process then goes down the 
appropriate paths based on a "YES" or "NO 11 
response.
The process described so far covers evident 
functional failures. However, had the answer 
to the initial question been "NO", indicating 
that the functional failure was not evident 
to the operating crew, then one further 
question is required before the determination 
of the consequence of failure is completed.
The question which must be asked in this 
case:
DOES THE COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN 
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE ADDITIONAL 
FAILURE OF A SYSTEM RELATED OR BACK-UP 
FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON 
OPERATING SAFETY?
Again, this question is asked for each hidden 
functional failure. It takes into account 
failures in which the loss of one hidden 
function alone, i.e., a failure unknown to 
operating crews does not affect safety; 
however, in combination with an additional 
functional failure, has a adverse effect on 
operating safety.
Depending on either a "YES" or "NO" answer, 
tasks are developed for safety or economic 
considerations.
The MSG-3 process described to this point 
covers the consequence of failure category. 
Based on the logic path followed, each 
functional failure will fall into one of the 
following effect categories:
Safety
Operational (economic)
Non-Operational (economic)
Hidden, Safety
Hidden, Non-Safety (economic)
Each of these categories contains a task 
definition logic which must be completed to 
develop an applicable and effective task.
Task development is handled in a similar 
manner for each of the five effect 
categories. For task determination, it is 
necessary to apply the failure causes for 
the functional failure to the second level 
of the logic. There are seven possible task 
resultant questions in the Effect 
categories. See Figure 1.
The MSG-3 method for conducting structural 
item analysis is quite extensive and 
therefore, only a brief outline of the 
process will be discussed here.
The process is designed to relate the 
scheduled maintenance program to 
consequences of structural item functional 
failure. The structures susceptability to 
damage and the degree of difficulty involved 
in detecting such damage. Once this is 
established, the effectiveness of several 
levels of inspections and accomplishment are 
evaluated and the results compared. 
Finally, based on the most effective 
combination, a structural maintenance 
program is determined.
The important elements of the process are:
Identify items as Structural 
Significant Items (SSI) or Other 
Structure.
A Structural Significant Item (SSI) is 
a structural detail, a structural 
element, or a structural assembly, 
which is judged significant because of 
the reduction in aircraft residual 
strength or loss of structural function 
which are consequences of its failure. 
Other Structure is that which is judged 
not to be a Structural Significant 
Item. It is defined both externally 
and internally within zonal boundaries. 
Classify SSI's as damage tolerant of 
safe-life structure. 
An item is judged to be damage tolerant 
if it can sustain damage and the 
remaining structure can withstand 
reasonable loads without structural 
failure or excessive structural 
deformation until the damage is 
detected.
Safe-life Structure is structure which 
is not practical to design or qualify 
as damage tolerant:
Its reliability is protected by discard 
limits which remove items from service 
before failures are expected.
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For each damage tolerant SSI, rate separately 
ir.s susceptibility to each of the three 
deterioration processes:
Fatigue
Lnvi ronmental deterioration
Accidental damage
Select for each damage tolerant SSI the 
following inspection features:
Level and method of inspection
Inspection of threshold
Frequency of inspection (repeat
interval;
Fleet leader/age exploration program, if
applicable
For each safe-life SSI, rate separately its 
susceptibility to the two deterioration 
processes:
Environmental 
Accidental Damage
Select for each safe-life SSI the following 
inspection features:
Level and method of inspection
Threshold of initial inspection (if
appropriate)
Frequency of inspection (repeat
Overlay the inspection requirements for each 
SSI according to the deterioration processes 
for which it was rated. Consolidate tasks 
and document the results.
For Other Structure, establish appropriate 
maintenance tasks based on:
Past experience, arid/or
Manufacturer's recommendation for new 
materials and/or concepts.
APPLICATION OF MSG-3 TO SHUTTLE
A project was initiated in 1982 by Pan Am, 
under contract to Rockwell International at 
Downey, California, to develop a Shuttle 
Maintenance Steering Group - 1 (SMSG-1) 
system for application to Space Shuttle, 
based on the MSG-3 analytical system. During 
fiscal year '83, the SMSG-1 was developed and 
applied to three orbiter systems and the aft 
fuselage structure. The resulting 
maintenance tasks were compared with the 
existing maintenance requirements (OMRSD) 
with the following conclusions:
Existing OMRSD requirements are not 
excessive.
SMSG reveals a valid reed to add some
tasks for detection of failure of
hidden functions.
SMSG performs a valuable systematic
audit function.
Assures "important requirements are not
overlooked, deleted.
Assures current requirements are
justified (not excessive).
Provides a data base for evaluating
future proposed changes.
SMSG structural analysis will provide a 
comprehensive, cost effective structural 
inspection requirements plan.
An extension of the project into 1984/85 has 
been made to apply SMSG-1 analysis to the 
remainder of the orbiter systems and develop- 
the structural inspection requirements for 
the entire Orbiter.
APPLICATION OF MSG-3 TO SHUTTLE GSL (Fig. 2)
The great quantity of ground support 
equipment at KSC, its complexity and the 
enormous number of man hours spent 
maintaining it prompted the question - Can 
application of MSG-3 concepts to the GSE 
produce efficient maintenance programs, 
while retaining the inherent safety and 
reliability of the equipment?
The Pan Am team at KSC, under SPC, initiated 
a project to develop an adaptation of MSG-3 
for GSE. The acronym, 'SEMSG-1 1 was 
selected for identification and stands for, 
"Support Equipment Maintenance Steering 
Group", First issue. The SEMSG-1 User's 
Guide was developed to supplement the MSG-3 
document in producing the GSE maintenance 
programs.
The first piece of GSE selected for 
application of the SEMSG-1 concepts was a 
new mobile aerial work platform (cherry 
picker) with a 170 foot vertical reach, the 
Condor 170.
The analysis is complete ana an example is 
attached as Appendix I. The complete 
maintenance program is still under 
development. However, the sample indicates 
the program will be successful in meeting 
its goals.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
The Space Shuttle maintenance program is 
presently made up of the following elements:
The Operational Maintenance Requirements and 
Specifications Documents (OMRSD) are the 
basis of the Shuttle routine maintenance 
programs. The requirements were established
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during Shuttle development by the 
manufacturers of the Orbiter, ET and SRB's in 
conjunction with and approval of NASA. Now 
that the Shuttle is operational, these 
requirements need constant review to keep the 
maintenance program viable and effective and 
to reduce costs while ensuring the desired 
level of safety is maintained (See Figure 3).
The Operational Maintenance Instructions 
(OMI's), also part of the routing maintenance 
program, translate the OMRSD into a working 
document which provides the step by step 
procedures for doing the tasks required on 
the Shuttle elements. It also sets the 
material and ground support equipment 
requirements. The OMI's need review to 
insure the OMRSD requirements are not 
exceeded and that the tasks are performed In 
a safe and efficient manner (See Figure 4), 
The OMI system will be replaced by a Job Card 
system to streamline the control, handling 
and accomplishment of the tasks.
The non-routine part of the maintenance 
program originates from flight anomalies 
(Figure 5} and inspection/test generated 
discrepancy items (Figure 6). This is the 
part of the maintenance program that restores 
the safety and reliability to their inherent 
levels when deterioration has occurred. It 
also is telling us something very important, 
if we are listening. It is like going to a 
doctor when you don't feel "up to par". He 
examines you, runs various tests, X-rays, 
etc., analyzes your symptoms and results of 
the tests, than gives you some medication or 
puts you in the hospital to correct your 
immediate problems. To complete the process, 
he then advises you what changes you must 
make in your lifestyle to keep these problems 
from recurring. The same is true of our 
Shuttle maintenance programs. We must 
analyze the anomalies and problem reports to 
determine if routine programs are keeping our 
Shuttle healthy, safe and efficient.
MAINTENANCE INFORMATION FEEDBACK SYSTEMS
The maintenance process, to remain dynamic 
and efficient, must have an effective 
monitoring system. This is provided in the 
airlines through Maintenance Information 
Feedback Systems. These systems are 
developed from the user standpoint, thus, 
assuring an effective program.
The first phase of the program is to 
determine what data needs to be retained to 
provide a measure of the various aspects of 
performance. The data sources can be 
component unscheduled removals, systems test 
discrepancies, flight anomalies, inspection 
findings, launch delays, etc.. Once 
collected, the data must be cataloged to
enable those needing the data to retrieve it 
in a logical, usable manner. The data is 
then analyzed to determine what it can tell 
us, if we ask the right questions:
Do we have a problem affecting safety?
What is the economic impact?
Are we exceeding our economic
projections?.
Will we be exposed to possible launch
delays?
Is the maintenance program adequate?
A good information feedback system can 
provide the answers for these questions and 
many more.
Therefore, we propose to review the present 
data gathering, cataloging, retrieval and 
analysis systems to determine their adequacy 
in supporting the maintenance process.
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EFFECT CATEGORIES
EVIDENT SAF TY
•
•
•
•
•
•
EVIDENT OPERATIONAL 
(ECONOMIC)
•
•
*
•
*
•
*
•
EVIDENT NON-OPERATIONAL 
(ECONOMIC)
•
•
*
•
it
•
*
•
HIDDEN SAFETY
•
•
•
•
•
• .
HIDDEN NON-SAFETY 
(ECONOMIC)
•
•
it
•
*
•
*
•
TASK QUESTIONS
A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK APPLICABLE 
AND EFFECTIVE?
B(1). IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF 
FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL 
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B(2). ISCHECKTOVERIFYOPERATION APPLICABLE 
AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE FINDING TASK).
C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF 
FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT TASK(S) 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE FAILURE 
RATE APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES OR 
REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION OF TASKS 
WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
YES/NO
*USE ONLY IF ANSWER TO PREVIOUS QUESTION IS "NO". 
FOR "YES" ANSWER, DESCRIBE TASK. FOR "NO" ANSWER, STATE WHY.
Figure 1
4-27
MSG-3 APPLICATION TO STS GSE
• FIRST YEAR — FY 1984
• USING MSG-3 ANALYTICAL SYSTEM AS A BASIS, DEVELOP 
SEMSG-1 SYSTEM FOR APPLICATION TO SPACE SHUTTLE 
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
• APPLY SEMSG-1 ANALYSIS TO SELECTED GSE:
• SHUTTLE NON-FLIGHT HARDWARE GSE
• GROUND FACILITIES
• SHUTTLE FLIGHT HARDWARE GSE
• COMPARE SEMSG-1 RESULTING MAINTENANCE TASKS 
WITH EXISTING REQUIREMENTS
• EVALUATE RESULTS OF ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
• REVISE REQUIREMENTS TO ADD, DELETE OR CHANGE 
MAINTENANCE TASKS AS SUBSTANTIATED BY SEMSG-1 
ANALYSIS
• SECOND YEAR - FY 1985 AND CONTINUING
• APPLY SEMSG-1 ANALYSIS TO REMAINDER OF SHUTTLE 
GSE
• COMPARE SEMSG-1 RESULTING MAINTENANCE TASKS 
WITH EXISTING REQUIREMENTS
• ESTABLISH MAINTENANCE INFORMATION SYSTEM TO 
MONITOR GSE MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS
Figure 2
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OMRSD
BASIC ROUTINE 
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
OPERATIONAL AND FUNTIONAL TESTS 
SERVICING ITEMS 
COMPONENT REPLACEMENTS 
STRUCTURAL INSPECTION PROGRAM 
SYSTEMS INSPECTION PROGRAM
THESE WILL BE REVIEWED TO:
1. RE-ESTABLISH THE NEED FOR THEIR EXISTANCE
2. RE-ESTABLISH THE FREQUENCY REQUIREMENTS
3. INVESTIGATE FOR REDUCTION IN TASK LEVEL AND 
SCOPE
Figure 3
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OMI'S
(WORK ITEMS)
SET THE MATERIAL 
AND GROUND SUPPORT
REQUIREMENTS TO 
ACCOMPLISH THE OMRSD'S
AND PROVIDE
THE STEP BY STEP
PROCEDURES FOR ACCOMPLISHING
THE ACTUAL WORK
THESE WILL BE REVIEWED TO:
1. VERIFY WORK CONTENT COMPLIES WITH AND DOES 
NOT EXCEED OMRSD REQUIREMENTS
2. SIMPLIFY WORK PROCEDURES
3. GAIN INFORMATION REGARDING GROUND SUPPORT 
EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND INTERFACES.
Figure 4
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FLIGHT 
ANOMALIES
(FLIGHT LOG ITEMS OR 
IN-FLIGHT DISCREPANCIES)
PART OF NON-ROUTINE 
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
COMPONENT FAILURES 
SYSTEM MAL FUNCTIONS
THESE WILL BE REVIEWED TO:
1. DETERMINE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FAILURE 
AND ITS EFFECT ON SAFETY AND/OR ECONOMIC 
IMPACT.
2. DETERMINED ADEQUACY OF MAINTENANCE 
PROGRAM.
Figure 5
INSPECTION/TEST
GENERATED
DISCREPANCY
ITEMS
THESE ARE NON-ROUTINE ITEMS 
RESULTING FROM STRUCTURAL AND 
SYSTEMS ROUTINE INSPECTIONS. 
ALSO, ARE ANOMALIES FOUND DURING 
SYSTEMS TESTS AND CHECKOUTS.
WE WILL REVIEW THESE FOR:
1. STRUCTURAL OR SYSTEMS DEFECTS/ANOMALIES 
WHICH WILL DICTATE A MORE RESTRICTIVE 
INSPECTION/MAINTENANCE PROGRAM.
2. ABSENCE OF DEFECTS/ANOMALIES WHICH WILL
DICTATE A MORE LIBERAL INSPECTION/MAINTENANCE 
PROGRAM.
Figure 6
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AIRLINE MAINTENANCE 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
TYPICAL AIRLINE DATA REPORTS
• AIRCRAFT SYSTEM PROBLEM ALERTS
• FLIGHT DEPARTURE DELAYS
• FLIGHT CANCELLATIONS
• COMPONENT REMOVAL/FAILURE RATES
• COMPONENT FAILURE ANALYSIS
• BY SERIAL NO.
• BY AIRCRAFT
« BY FAILURE TYPE
• INSPECTION FINDINGS
• BY AIRCRAFT ZONE FOR STRUCTURES
• BY ATA CHAPTER FOR SYSTEMS
RESULTING ACTIONS
• REVISE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
• ADD ITEMS (TEST OR INSPECTION)
• REVISE SCOPE OF WORK
• REVISE FREQUENCY OF ACCOMPLISHMENT
• REVISE MAINTENANCE OR OPERATIONS MANUALS
• MODIFY AIRCRAFT AND/OR COMPONENTS
• REVISE SPARES REQUIREMENTS
Figure 7
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AIRLINE ENHANCEMENTS FOR 
SHUTTLE GROUND TURNAROUND
APPENDIX _I
TYPICAL 
SEMSG-1 ANALYSIS
CALAVAR
CONDOR MODEL 170
SYSTEM
HYDRAULIC
SUB-SYSTEM
STABILIZATION
4-34
SYSTEM BREAKDOWN AND FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
56-10-20
SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM
ITEM
HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION
SYSTEM BREAKDOWN AND FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION:
58-10-00 
HYDRAULICS
58-10-10 
POWER & DISTRIBUTION
58-10-20 
STABILIZATION
58-10-30 
AERIAL CONTROLS
CO 
CJI
— Jack/outrigger hydraulic cylinders ( 6 )
— Check valves
— Counterbalance valve 
^-Aft outrigger lock assy
— Sequence valves
—Solenoid control valves
Form Fl Feb. 13/84 Prepared by: Date:
SYSTEM BREAKDOWN AND FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
58-10-20
SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM
ITEM
HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION
SYSTEM BREAKDOWN AND FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION:
The vehicle platform is leveled and stabilized by four hydraulic cylinders. Two forward jacks are mounted in the
end of the front bunper frame. The two aft jacks are mounted on outriggers and are spread horizontally outward
from the vehicle frame by the outrigger hydraulic cylinder.
Leveling and stabilization of the vehicle platform must be acconplished prior to using the aerial lift functions. 
Limit switches mounted on each jack and wired in parallel lock out all other functions until each jack is firmly 
positioned and loaded.
During the jacking process, hydraulic fluid is directed to the extend side of .the actuators by the solenoid operated 
control valve. A sequence valve causes the outrigger lock cylinder to retract, unlocking the outrigger assembly. 
Fluid is then directed to the extend side of the outrigger cylinder. A second sequence valve prevents extension 
of the vertical jack cylinder until the outriggers are fully extended in the horizontal direction.
When the vehicle is fully leveled and stabilized, hydraulic fluid is "locked in" the jack cylinder by check valves 
in both the extend and retract lines. Thermal expansion of the "locked in" fluid could move the cylinder piston 
and unlevel the platform. To prevent this, a counterbalance valve is installed between the extend and return lines 
to allow equalization of the pressures in the cylinder.
Form Fl Feb. 13/84 Prepared by: Date:
FUNCTIONS/FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
58-10-20
SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM
ITEM
HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION
FUNCTION(S) 
(Identify each by no.)
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE(S) FAILURE EFFECT(S) 
(Only one effect per failure)
FAILURE CAUSE(S)
(Identify each by no. and 
letter
1. Jack up & level vehicle 
platform.
1. Fails to jack up & level 
vehicle bed.
1. Loss of vehicle use.
2. Maintain stable vehicle 
platform under all load 
conditons & directions.
2. Fails to maintain stable 
vehicle platform under all 
load conditions & 
directions.
2. Possible vehicle upset 
with personnel injuries.
Form F2 Feb . 13/84
l.A Solenoid operated control 
valve(s) inoperat ive.
l.B Aft outrigger locking 
cylinder inoperative.
l.C Aft outrigger sequence 
valve fails open.
l.D Outrigger extension 
binding.
l.E Counterbalance valve 
failed open.
2.A One or more jack cylinders 
bypassing or leaking.
2.B One or more check valves 
leaking.
2.C Counterbalance valve 
fails open.
Prepared by: Dates
FAILURE EFFECT CATEGORY
ITEM: HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION
FAILURE: Fails to jack up and level vehicle platform. 
FAILURE EFFECT: Loss of vehicle use.
IDENTIFICATION NO.
58-10-20
FUNCTION: 1. 
FAILURE: 1.
FAILURE EFFECT CATEGORY
1 IS OCCURRENCE OF FUNCTIONAL FAILURE EVIDENT TO 
OPERATION PERSONNEL DURING NORMAL DUTIES OR TO 
LAUNCH CONTROL VIA SYSTEM MONITORING?
YES NO
CO 
00
DOES FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR 
SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING 
FROM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE 
HAVE DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT 
ON OPERATING SAFETY?
DOES COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN 
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE 
ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF A 
SYSTEM RELATED OR BACKUP 
FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE 
EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY?
YES NO
DOES FUNCTIONAL FAILURE 
HAVE DIRECT ADVERSE 
EFFECT ON OPERATING 
CAPABILITY?
YES
2
EVIDENT
NON-OPERATIONAL 
ECONOMIC
NO
8
HIDDEN 
SAFETY
2
HIDDEN 
ECONOMIC
QUESTION NO. (Answer and explain)
1. Yes - Operator has to visually monitor 
each jack position to properly 
level and stabilize vehicle 
platform.
)/3. No - Aerial platform would still be 
in a stowed position.
4- Yes - Aerial controls cannot be
operated until vehicle level
& stabilized. Use of vehicle
is lost until discrepancy corrected
CATEGORY: 6, Evident Operational Economic
Form F3 Feb. 13/84 Prepared by: Date:
SELECTED TASKS /FREQUENCY DETERMINATION
ITEM: HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATAION IDENTIFICATION NO.
FAILURE CAUSE: 1A< SOLENOID OPERATED CONTROL VALVE INOPERATIVE 58-10-20
EFFECT CATEGORY
5 (£
o
o
o
o
0
o
o
o
*
o
*
o
it
0
i 7 8 9
0
o
*
o
*
0
*
o
o
0
o
o
o
0
0
o
it
o
*
o
*
0
QUESTION
A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL 
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE 
FINDING TASK) .
C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT 
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE 
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
E. . IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES 
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION 
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO".
SELECTED 
TASK None
YES/NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)
No consumables to replenish.
Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable 
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.
Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable 
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.
FREQUENCY: None
REDESIGN: Q MANDATORY Q DESIRABLE Q NOT REQUIRED
SELECTED TASKS /FREQUENCY DETERMINATION
ITEM: HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION IDEWTIFICATION NO.
FAILURE CAUSE:
EFFECT CATEGORY
5<S
o
o
o
o
0
o
0
0
* 
o
*
o
it
0
) 7 8 9
o
o
*
o
*
o
*
0
o
0
o
o
0
o
o
o
*
0
*
0
* 
0
co in on
1B. AFT OUTRIGGER LOCKING CYLINDER INOPERATIVE
QUESTION
A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL 
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE 
FINDING TASK).
C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT 
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE 
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES 
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION 
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO" .
SELECTED Lubricate mechanical portion of 
TASK aft outrigger locking cylinder.
YES/NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)
Lubricate mechanical portion of lock.
Reduced resistance to hydraulic failure is not 
detectable nor is rate of resistance to failure 
predictable .
Reduced resistance to hydraulic failure is not 
detectable nor is rate of resistance to failure 
predictable.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.
FREQUENCY: Every six months.
REDESIGN: Q MANDATORY Q DESIRABLE 0 NOT REQUIRED
SELECTED TASKS/FREQUENCY DETEIMINATION
ITEM: HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATAION IDRNTIFTCATTON NO.
FAILURE CAUSE: 1C. AFT OUTRIGGER SEQUENCE VALVE STUCK OPEN 58-10-20
EFFECT CATEGORY
5(5
o
0
0
0
o
o
o
o
*
0
*
0
it
0
) 7 8 9
0
0
*
0
*
o
ie
O
O
o
0
o
0
o
o
o
*
o
*
0
*
o
QUESTION
A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL 
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS, CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE 
FINDING TASK).
C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT 
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE 
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES 
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION 
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO".
SELECTED 
TASK None
YES/NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)
No consumables to replenish.
Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable 
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.
Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable 
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.
FREQUENCY : None
REDESIGN: 1 Q MANDATORY [~] DESIRABLE 0 NOT REQUIRED
SELECTED TASKS /FREQUENCY DETERMINATION
™: HYDRAULICS - STARII I7ATTON IDENTIFICATION NO.
FAILURE CAUSE: ^ n||TRTnRFR FXTFN q TnN RTNnTN
EFFECT CATEGORY
5 &
o
o
o
o
0
0
o
0
*
o
*
o
* 
o
789
o
o
*
o
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o
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o
o
o
o
o
0
0
o
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o
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O
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QUESTION
A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL 
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE 
FINDING TASK).
C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT 
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE 
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES 
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION 
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO".
SELECTED 
TASK Lubricate mechanical portion of 
outriggers .
p 58-10-20
YES /NO
YES
YES
DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note) 
Lubricate mechanical portion of outriggers.
Noisy or "chattering" extension of outrigger 
will be obvious to operator.
Note: If answer to question is "YES" r describe; if "NO", state why.
FREQUENCY: Every six months.
REDESIGN: Q MANDATORY Q DESIRABLE 0 ^^ KEQUJRED
SELECTED TASKS/FREQUENCY DETERMINATION
ITEM: HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION VERIFICATION NO.
FAILURE CAUSE: 1E . COUNTERBALANCE VALVE FAILED OPEN 58-10-20
EFFECT CATEGORY
5 &
0
0
o
o
o
0
o
o
*
0
*
o
*
o
) 7 8 9
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o
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0
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o
o
*
o
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o
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QUESTION
A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL 
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE 
FINDING TASK).
C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT 
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE 
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES 
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION 
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO" .
SELECTED 
TASK None
YES/NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)
No consumables to replenish.
Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable 
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.
Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable 
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.
FREQUENCY: None
REDESIGN: Q MANDATORY Q DESIRABLE g] NOT REQUIRED
FAILURE EFFECT CATEGORY
ITEM: HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION
FAILURE: Fails to maintain stable vehicle platform under 
all load conditions
& directions. 
FAILURE EFFECT: Possible vehicle upset and personnel injuries.
IDENTIFICATION NO.
58-10-20
FUNCTION: 2. 
FAILURE: 2.
FAILURE EFFECT CATEGORY
IS OCCURRENCE OF FUNCTIONAL FAILURE EVIDENT TO 
OPERATION PERSONNEL DURING NORMAL DUTIES OR TO 
LAUNCH CONTROL VIA SYSTEM MONITORING?
YES NO
DOES FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR 
SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING 
FROM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE 
HAVE DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT 
ON OPERATING SAFETY?
YES
DOES COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN 
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE 
ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF A 
SYSTEM RELATED OR BACKUP 
FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE 
EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY?
NO
DOES FUNCTIONAL FAILURE 
HAVE DIRECT ADVERSE 
EFFECT ON OPERATING 
CAPABILITY?
YES
EVIDENT
NON-OPERATIONAL 
ECONOMIC
QUESTION NO. (Answer and explain)
1- No - There are no hydraulic pressure
gauges or sensors in jack struts. 
A loss of pressure in any strut 
would not be known until it failed 
to hold load.
2.f3) Yes - Loss of vehicle stability 
in conjunction with a Stability 
Warning System failure' could 
result in vehicle upset and 
personnel injuries.
4.
CATEGORY: 8, Hidden Safety
Form F3 Feb. 13/84
Prepared by: Date:
SELECTED TASKS/FREQUENCY DETERMINATION
ITEM: HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION IDEOTIFICATION NO,
FAILURE CAUSE: 2A. ONE OR MORE JACK CYLINDERS BYPASSING OR LEAKING 58-10-20
EFFECT CATEGORY
5 6 7 (*T
0
0
0
0
0
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*
0
* 
0
* 
0
o
o
* 
0
* 
0
* 
0
o
o
0
0
0
o
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o
o
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0
*
0
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QUESTION
A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL 
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE 
FINDING TASK) .
C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR "OFF-UNIT 
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE 
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES 
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION 
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO".
SELECTED 1. Pe 
TASK ar 
2. Pe 
e*
rform "Stab. Test" in accord- 
ice with Calavar. Maint . Manual.
-rform visual inspection for 
r ternal leak.
YES/NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)
No consumables to replenish.
A test to demonstrate unit can lift and hold the 
rated load would be effective. Also, a visual 
inspection for external leaks during procedure.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
Perform rated load test and visually inspect 
for leaks .
Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.
FREQUENCY: 1. Every six months 
2. Once each use
REDESIGN: Q MANDATORY Q DESIRABLE £) NOT REQUIRED
Form F4 Prepared by: Date:
SELECTED TASKS /FREQUENCY DETERMINATION
ITEMj - STABILIZATION IDENTIFICATION NO.
2B. ONE OR MORE CHECK VALVES LEAKING 58-10-20
5 6 7
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QUESTION
A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL 
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE 
FINDING TASK).
C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT 
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE 
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES 
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION 
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO".
SELECTED Perform "Stab. Test" in accordance 
TASK with instructions in Calavar 
Maintenance Manual.
YES/NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)
No consumables to replenish.
A test to demonstrate unit can lift and hold 
rated load would be effective.
Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable 
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
The item does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
Perform rated load test.
Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.
FREQUENCY: Every six months.
REDESIGN: [] MANDATORY [j DESIRABLE 0 NOT REQUIRED
SELECTED TASKS /FREQUENCY DETERMINATION
ITEM: HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION IDENTIFICATION NO.
FAILURE CAUSE: 2 C. COUNTERBALANCE VALVE FAILS OPEN 58-10-20
EFFECT CATEGORY
5 6 7 (§]
0
o
0
0
o
o
0
0
*
o
*
o
* 
o
0
0
* 
0
*
o
* 
o
0
o
0
0
0
0
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*
o
*
o
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o
QUESTION
A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL 
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE 
FINDING TASK).
C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION 
OF FUNCTION BY ON^UNIT OR OFF-UNIT 
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE 
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES 
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION 
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE?
* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO",
SELECTED Perf< 
TASK with 
main"
Drm "Stab, Test" in accordance 
instructions in Calavar 
tenance manual.
YES/NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)
No consumables to replenish.
A test to demonstrate unit can lift and hold 
rated load would be effective
Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable 
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.
The unit does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
The unit does not show functional degradation 
characteristics at an identifiable age.
Perform rated load test.
Notei If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.
FREQUENCY: Every six months.
REDESIGN! D MANDATORY Q DESIRABLE 0 NOT REQUIRED
